2 problems (and the means of addressing them) are framed in an open-ended way, and subjected to periodic revision by various forms of peer review in the light of locally generated knowledge. 3 The five key elements of GXG are outlined below. GXG takes place in the context of public and state regulation, and often relies on forms of state and public power. Yet it can also, by virtue of its systematic peer review, destabilize the established practices of regulatory institutions. As will be illustrated below, GXG institutions are often initiated transnationally through a range of public and private stakeholders, and the focus of activity regularly moves back and forth between public and private regulation. We argue that GXG is normatively justified by the deliberative and inclusive redefinition, based on exchanges of information and experience over time, of the preferences and goals that it fosters, although neither the success of deliberation nor the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders is assured.
The ideal-type of a GXG regime entails five key deliberation-fostering steps: First, initial reflection and discussion among stakeholders with a broadly shared perception of a common problem, resulting in second, the articulation of a framework understanding with open-ended goals. Third, implementation of these broadly framed goals is left to 'lower-level' or contextually situated actors who have knowledge of local conditions and considerable discretion to adapt the framework norms to these different contexts. Fourth, continuous feedback is provided from local contexts, allowing for reporting and monitoring across a range of contexts, with outcomes subject to peer review. Fifth, goals and practices should be periodically and routinely re-evaluated and, where appropriate, revised in light of the results of the peer review of literature on experimentalist governance in national and regional (particularly EU) contexts. Here, however, we discuss the incidence and spread of experimentalist governance in global and transnational settings. and the shared purposes. GXG regimes frequently operate in the shadow of a 'penalty default' that induces appreciation of the relative benefits of joint efforts by sanctioning non-co-operation, typically by substantially reducing the parties' control over their fate through the imposition of an alternative, less attractive regime or outcome that none of them favors. While GXG clearly shares features with various other accounts or theories of novel forms of transnational regulation, all five of the elements outlined above must be present to constitute a GXG system. Our hypothesis is that where these five features operate together, they can constitute a form of governance that fosters a normatively desirable form of deliberative and participatory problem solving.
It may be helpful here to distinguish GXG from some of the other post-hierarchical forms of new governance that it resembles. First, like the literature on collaborative governance and adaptive management of the environment, GXG emphasizes the importance of learning from implementation. 4 But adaptive management treats learning as a disembodied process, or analogizes it to a highly stylized (perhaps imaginary) idea of the scientific method. 5 GXG shows how practical learning can be organized and institutionalized, and how this process -particularly the autonomy it affords lower-level or locally situated units to adjust the implementation to local However, they are uncertain about how these objectives can be realized. Experimentalist institutions reflect participants' awareness of limits on their foresight, and of the possible fallibility of initially preferred solutions, more than their concern about distributional issues.
Accordingly, such institutions establish methods of periodically revising their procedures ex post on the basis of peer review of the diverse experience of the actors attempting to realize the desired outcomes.
Experimentalist institutions also establish patterns of accountability that are different from both those underpinning the standard principal-agent model and from the mechanisms of traditional hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal and market accountability that characterized world politics during the half-century after World War II. 11 They emphasize mutual monitoring and peer review that involves elaborate processes of consultation that are horizontal rather than vertical in structure. Peer review is thus a mechanism for both learning systematically from diverse experience and holding actors accountable for their actions. Experimentalism institutionalizes an iterated process of goal formulation, lower-level adaptation and exploration, joint evaluation and revision captured in the five steps set out above -beginning with the initial perception of a common problem and moving through articulating an initial framework of action, and arriving by way of local experience at revision.
Each of the other arrangements we describe in the next section -including traditional international organizations, various networked governance arrangements and contemporary 11 Grant and Keohane 2005, 36 (Table 2) .
6 regime complexes -may evolve into or develop practices of GXG. When international organizations routinize the ad hoc adjustments that are characteristic of regime complexes and adopt organizational forms that allow state and non-state actors to learn, continually and accountably, they are engaging in GXG. In other words, any governance arrangements -but only those arrangements -that meet all five of the key elements outlined above constitute GXG in our sense.
Next we situate our analysis of GXG in the context of two broad developments in multilateral governance over approximately the last sixty years: the emergence of integrated international regimes in certain issue areas and the emergence of less coherent regime complexes. We then focus for illustrative purposes on one particular example, the Montreal Protocol process, and conclude with a set of reflections on the conditions for GXG. Other salient examples of GXG not discussed in this article include the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, regulatory arrangements to catch tuna without killing dolphins and certification arrangements, especially in forestry.
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This article does not seek to evaluate the successes or failures of GXG. We take the view, however, that the participatory, deliberative, locally informed and adaptive problem solving that this form of governance is designed to foster is normatively attractive. Yet human institutionsincluding, inevitably, GXG -are easily distorted or corrupted, and unintended consequences are common. Nevertheless, we believe GXG has the potential to be a constructive development, establishing relationships of legitimate authority by keeping the circle of decision making open 12 For a more extended discussion of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and of the Tuna/Dolphin regime, see de Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel (2013) . On forestry certification see Overdevest and Zeitlin (2012 property and anti-corruption. 21 The proliferation of bilateral and regional deals on trade policy suggests that even international trade -whose lead organization, the WTO, has been so important -may be increasingly characterized by a regime complex rather than an integrated international regime.
22

EXEMPLIFYING GXG: THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
The Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which came into force in 1989 after more than a decade of contentious debate, established a regime to protect the ozone layer against the risks of chlorofluorocarbons and halons. The protocol -widely regarded as one of the most successful international environmental agreements -fixed an initial schedule for the reduction and elimination of ozone-depleting substances (ODS), with exceptions for 'essential' uses for which no substitutes could be found, and set out the core elements of a regime for extending and modifying protective measures. The parties were to apply certain control measures and reassess them every four years in light of current scientific, environmental, technical and economic information, as determined by panels of experts. Parties to the agreement were to report annual production, and imports and exports of regulated chemicals, and permit verification of their performance. Trade in controlled substances with non-parties was carefully restricted.
20 See Orsini, Morin, and Young (2013, 27) . These experimental arrangements plainly overtaxed not only the financial and technical capacities of developing countries (where the attendant risks of corruption were acute), but also the multilateral funds, as they were initially conceived. During the 1990s, therefore, a more comprehensive system emerged. In order to receive support, a developing country -having established a national ozone unit (at times with regional subdivisions) to collaborate with the fund -must prepare a national regulatory framework and detailed sector-by-sector plans for phasing out the production and use of ODS.
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This institutional development produced a highly decentralized global regime that is characterized by close links between sub-systems 'for reviewing implementation, responding to implementation problems, and revising and developing rules and institutions'. 26 The secretariat of the Montreal Protocol plays a coordinating role, but has little (if any) directive authority. Its main role is as a 'hub', performing information-pooling functions that facilitate exchanges between the center and local units. 27 This regime is dependent on continuing connections with 24 Greene 1998, 96-7; Parson 2003, 173-244. 25 World Bank 2004, x-xi; Zhao and Ortolano 2003. 26 See Greene 1998, 120; Victor 2011. 27 A recent study of the secretariats of five international environmental organizations -ranging from the UNEP, the OECD environment directorate, the International Maritime Organization, the environmental department of the World Bank to the Global Environment Facility -found the Montreal secretariat to be by far the smallest, employing only six to eight program officers, including the executive secretary and its deputy (Bauer 2007) .
the public and private sectors -often down to ground-level actors. It is therefore able to make the substantive and procedural rules, at once mandatory and subject to frequent revision, necessary to meet demanding phase-out targets while extending the control regime to new domains. 
CONDITIONS FOR EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE
Under what conditions is GXG likely to thrive as a mode of governance in world politics?
Although we have not developed a comprehensive theoretical answer, we present four hypotheses to spark further enquiry.
We suggest as a first necessary condition for GXG that governments are unable to formulate a comprehensive set of rules and effectively monitor compliance with them. In uncertain and diverse environments, in which central actors cannot readily foresee the local effects of rules, and where even effective rules are likely to be undermined by unforeseeable changes, this condition is likely to be met. 31 However, we consider that something akin to a penalty default can operate not only by virtue of the imposition of hierarchical authority, but also by reason of asymmetries of power among the actors involved (e.g., the United States can impose trade sanctions to block tuna that is not fished according to its regulatory standards), the invocation of pervasive norms or an effective consumer boycott (e.g., of goods made using sweatshop labor or non-sustainably forested products).
society and other stakeholders, should erect obstacles to familiar forms of capture, but they are also likely to create other kinds of vulnerability to outside influence and new opportunities to pursue hidden agendas and strategic advantages -for instance, by tempering criticism in return for access to decision makers. Thus GXG is not a panacea.
32
Yet one of the greatest normative merits of GXG is that it openly recognizes this vulnerability. We are often ill informed and unwilling to pay for the production of public goods.
Our analytical ability to predict human behavior is also limited, especially where strategic interactions are involved. We may recognize problems yet not know how to deal with them.
Under such conditions, GXG advises that we should often establish processes that help us generate unimagined alternatives that improve our ability to choose among these alternatives by rigorously exposing each to criticism in light of the others.
A final appealing feature of GXG is its potential to increase participation in, and thus the democratic legitimacy of, institutions. GXG may reduce the trade-off between overall responsiveness and democratic participation, broadly conceived. By opening agenda setting and problem solving to a wide range of actors, particularly from civil society, GXG makes possible a forward-looking or dynamic form of accountability that is unavailable in traditional, principalagent regimes. In GXG practices at their best, the openness of decision making improves dynamic accountability, which increases participation in decision making. While this amounts neither to traditional, representative democracy nor to counter-majoritarian constitutionalism, we argue that it can constitute a form of deliberative, collective rule making that may contribute in global contexts to self-governance under the rule of law.
32 See, e.g., Ostrom, Janssen, and Anderies (2007) and Ostrom (2011) .
